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Discrimination in Labor Markets
Edward P. Lazear 
University of Chicago
Labor market discrimination in this country has been illegal at least 
since 1964 when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act outlawed it. The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the 1963 Equal Pay Act, which requires that in 
dividuals doing the same job must receive the same pay, are primarily 
responsible for protecting individuals against race and sex discrimina 
tion. Age discrimination is covered under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, which was designed to prevent disparate treatment 
of older workers. This act has been sporadically amended and now essen 
tially eliminates mandatory retirement.
Before analyzing the specifics of age discrimination, I will briefly 
describe what is and what is not discrimination in the labor market. 
First, in order to have been discriminated against, an individual must 
be in a protected category. Not all workers are members of protected 
classes. The largest protected classes in this country consist of females, 
blacks, and individuals who are covered by the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act. Old is now defined as over 40.
Other minorities are also protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and the definition of protected categories has evolved over time. Hispanics 
are protected workers, but, in most circumstances, Asians are not. For 
example, at the University of California, Asians do not count toward 
meeting any kind of quotas for racial balance. In fact, they count the 
wrong way, and there has been recent action by white students to limit 
the number of Asians because they are represented in numbers that ex 
ceed their proportion in the population. Other groups, such as Jews, 
are not in a protected class.
Individuals rarely win suits based on discrimination due to physical 
characteristics, such as obesity or baldness. Sexual preference has, with 
only a few exceptions, been deemed a legitimate criterion for employ 
ment, so that homosexuals rarely win discrimination suits. While some
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of these more controversial criteria are interesting, they are probably 
less important at a practical level than discrimination on the basis of 
education. That might seem somewhat bizarre, but it lies at the heart 
of what practices are permitted in the labor market.
For example, suppose that an employer imposes a requirement that 
an individual must possess a college degree in order to obtain a job. 
Suppose further that this requirement has the effect of creating a job 
category that is 98 percent white. Has the employer engaged in 
discrimination by using education as a proxy for race? The answer 
depends on the job-relatedness of the education requirement. If the job 
were garbage collector, for example, the courts would hold that educa 
tion was a guise for a racial barrier, having nothing to do with the skill 
level needed to do the job. On the other hand, if the job required signifi 
cant accounting skills, courts would probably hold that education re 
quirement was appropriate and not merely a facade for discrimination.
There are essentially two ways to prove discrimination in the labor 
market context: first, by showing what is called disparate treatment, and 
second, by showing disparate impact. Disparate treatment is easier to 
prove, but it requires more direct evidence. An example of a disparate 
treatment case would be one where plaintiffs obtain a memo written by 
management that instructs subordinates to send only white applicants 
up for approval, either at the hiring level or for promotion. Another ex 
ample of disparate treatment is one where sexual harassment can be shown 
by the testimony of coworkers or customers. This is sometimes referred 
to as finding a "smoking gun" or, in other words, the murder weapon 
in its just-used state. But smoking guns are rarely found.
Most discrimination actions try to show disparate impact by 
demonstrating that a pattern of discrimination exists. Disparate impact 
cases are almost always statistical in nature, and provide employment 
for a large number of the labor economists in the profession today. Con 
sider the two following examples.
One case involves a local firm, Stroh's Brewery, which had two jobs: 
one called bottler, and the other called brewer. The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleged that those two jobs were 
essentially the same. But an examination of the data revealed that brewers
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were primarily first-generation Germans, whereas bottlers were central- 
city blacks from Detroit. Furthermore, a statistical analysis revealed that 
even holding education and experience level constant, a black was less 
likely to be assigned the brewer's job than a white worker with similar 
skills. In this case, three things need to be established. First, that the 
two jobs were essentially identical. Second, that the jobs paid differing 
amounts, and in particular, the job with white employees paid a higher 
amount than the job with black employees. And third, that the distribu 
tion of job assignments was not independent of race.
In order to establish the first, an industrial engineer is generally call 
ed in to testify that the tasks of the two jobs are the same. The second 
is easily established by looking at payroll data and correcting for ex 
perience of the individuals. Those two pieces of evidence then set the 
situation up for a violation of the Equal Pay Act, because the two jobs 
are deemed to be equal, but receive different salaries. This, in conjunc 
tion with a racial distribution that goes against a protected group, im 
plies a violation by disparate impact.
In the particular case of Stroh's Brewery, I was retained by the EEOC 
and worked into the early part of 1981 when the Reagan administration 
took over. There was a dramatic change in the policy of EEOC at that 
point, and the Reagan administration instructed EEOC to settle this case 
within 30 days, for better or worse. On the good side, a settlement was 
reached between Stroh's and the plaintiffs, and costly litigation was prob 
ably avoided. Whether this had a negative effect on the future prospects 
of black workers at Stroh's remains to be shown.
The second disparate impact case example was an age discrimination 
case. New York Life was being sued by nine of its older employees who 
charged that they were forced to retire, and were not offered the same 
terms as similarly situated younger workers. This case was actually a 
combination of disparate impact and disparate treatment, because the 
nine individuals tried to bring in evidence that their superiors told them 
directly that they should retire because of their age. I was asked to testify 
by the defense in this particular case, and was able to show, by using 
statistical evidence, that in fact, not only was there no disparate impact 
that worked against older workers, but if anything, older workers seemed
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to be favored by the firm. That is, holding all worker characteristics 
constant, older general managers at New \brk Life received higher earn 
ings and were more likely to be retained in their jobs than their perfor 
mance would warrant, as compared with younger workers. So even though 
there was some evidence of disparate treatment, it was not sufficient 
to convince the jury, given the counter-evidence on disparate impact, 
that New York Life engaged in any discrimination on the basis of age.
Let me move on to a different topic, which I call the hierarchy of 
discrimination. Frequently, antidiscrimination policies run into conflict 
with one another, as when one protected group is vying with another 
for favorable treatment. A good illustration comes from recent Chicago 
patronage jobs. When Harold Washington was Mayor of Chicago, many 
of the jobs that had previously gone to white workers were given to black 
workers. In addition, a large number of city contracts that had previously 
gone to white firms, went to firms owned by black individuals. But 
Hispanics did not fare well under the Washington administration; and 
although they did not bring any major litigation against the Washington 
administration, they were instrumental in the election of Richard Daley 
over Washington's right-hand man, Tim Evans. Hispanics felt that they 
were coming into direct conflict with blacks for good jobs, and one ex 
planation of their voting pattern is that they felt that they would do bet 
ter under the Daley regime than they would under the Evans regime.
The issue, from an academic's point of view, is: How do we trade 
off the legitimate demands of various protected groups, and how do we 
decide to favor one group over another, because invariably, their demands 
are going to conflict with one another. I believe that labor market 
discrimination has the most negative social impact on equity when it 
is done on the basis of race. Discrimination on the basis of sex is less 
insidious, and discrimination on the basis of age is probably the least 
harmful. So if we have to choose between favoring one group or another, 
either in a specific situation or in terms of using scarce resources for 
enforcement, I would say that we should worry about racial discrimina 
tion first, and the others should follow.
My justification is to pose the following question: Assuming that 
discrimination is rampant and significant, who is hurt by it? If a black
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is discriminated against, the black suffers the full burden of discrimina 
tion. Females who are discriminated against may suffer the full burden 
of discrimination, unless they are married to a male who benefits from 
discrimination. Obviously, not all women are married; nor are women 
who are married, married throughout their lifetimes. But the relevant 
unit for most purposes, in determining the standard of living, is the 
household; and most women live in households that contain males. It 
is not true that most blacks live in households that contain whites. As 
a result, if tough choices have to be made, my personal view is that favor 
ing females over blacks would have negative implications for income 
distribution and would be more harmful than favoring blacks at tne ex 
pense of females. Furthermore, the male-female situation seems to be 
correcting itself, which cannot be said for the black-white situation.
Finally, age discrimination is the least important of all, for the following 
reason: All individuals who are old, were once young. So even if the 
relevant unit is the individual rather than the household, individuals who 
are discriminated against when they are old, will on average have been 
discriminated in favor of, when they were young. A second reason is 
that a contract, either explicit or implicit, made with the worker may 
cover a significant chunk of his lifetime. So, even in the absence of any 
discrimination, one could observe a worker who is treated one way at 
one age and another way at another age, as a result of totally voluntary 
contracts.
Preventing age "discrimination" may prevent employers and workers 
from entering into agreements that make both sides better off. The same 
is not true of racial discrimination. If a white worker and a white employer 
contract to exclude blacks from the job, that makes whites better off, 
but it makes blacks worse off. It is not the case that a black worker merely 
has to wait a few years until he becomes a white one.
Another kind of hierarchy of discrimination that I'd like to mention has 
to do with the focus of discrimination law and enforcement. Should en 
forcement look at the hiring decision, the promotion decision, or wages? 
My view is that hiring is most important; promotion is second; and wages 
are third. Wages are least important because once hiring and promotion 
have been covered, there is not much discrimination on the basis of
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wages. If two workers who are at the same firm holding the same job 
are compared, it is very unlikely that the one who is black will be receiv 
ing significantly lower wages than one who is white in some way that 
is not explained by seniority.
Most of the differences in earnings of black and white workers, and 
particularly of male and female workers, take the form not so much of 
wage differences within the job, but rather, finding individuals in dif 
ferent jobs. Men and women who are doing the same job, receive the 
same wages. But women do not work in the same firms that men work 
in; nor, within the firm, are they likely to be in the same jobs. As is 
well-known, women are likely to be concentrated in lower-level white- 
collar jobs, clerical jobs, and less well paid service jobs. So to the ex 
tent that there is discrimination against females, correcting the job assign 
ment is likely to remedy most of the problem. The reason that I put 
hiring first, is that industrial differences and firm differences are really 
quite significant. Women, for example, are found to a much greater ex 
tent in service industries, and males to a much greater extent in durable 
manufacturing. That may be choice rather than chance; but to the ex 
tent that it is discrimination, it is implemented by discrimination in hiring.
Let me turn now to some evidence on what has happened in recent 
years and what we should be worrying about. Perhaps the most impor 
tant statistic shown in recent wage studies is that women are doing bet 
ter; and, some people think, a lot better. Labor force participation rates 
for females continue to rise, and despite this large labor market inflow 
by women, wages of females have not only kept up, but have gained 
on their male counterparts.
Females are much more likely to be found in professional jobs today 
than they were 10 or 15 years ago. In the typical business school today, 
anywhere from 20 to 40 percent of the students are female, whereas 
20 years ago that number would have been closer to 2 percent. The same 
is true in medical schools, and particularly in law schools. So there is 
a substantial professionalization of the female workforce.
While it is still true that females do not seem to have gotten signifi 
cant access to many jobs, such as very high level positions in major
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corporations, there is evidence that we are seeing a vintage effect. That 
is, since females have only recently made progress into middle levels 
of management, it will take a few years before we observe a high pro 
portion of females in upper management as well. I have little doubt that 
females will be moving into those jobs in significant numbers, although 
perhaps not in proportion to their numbers in the population. So I think 
the situation for females is getting much better.
Unfortunately, the same thing cannot be said for blacks. In the last 
presidential campaign, much was made by the Dukakis camp of the 
widening income distribution. The income distribution has gotten less 
equal in recent years for two reasons. First, wages of highly educated, 
highly trained workers have gone up. Second, wages of unskilled workers 
have fallen. This is particularly significant for uneducated blacks.
High school dropouts have been hurt badly by the trends of the '80s. 
Not that new jobs are bad. Just the reverse. But jobs formerly in Michigan 
are now in Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
There are at least two interpretations of these data. First, it can be 
argued that wages are felling for blacks, and particularly for less educated 
blacks, because of increased discrimination. This might be attributed 
to political changes for example, the Reagan policies of the '80s; or 
to increased desire by firms for discrimination. The latter seems unlikely, 
but the former remains a candidate.
The second possible explanation is that changes in the industrial struc 
ture of the United States have decreased the wages of unskilled labor 
relative to those of skilled labor, and that this has nothing to do with 
changes in discrimination. My view is that the evidence points to the 
second namely, to the industrial shifts explanation. First, the industries 
that have been hurt the most are those that have had the largest propor 
tion of foreign competition. So it looks as though unskilled workers in 
the United States are unable to compete successfully, at current wages, 
with unskilled workers overseas; but skilled workers in the United States 
seem to do quite well in organizing foreign unskilled workers. The sec 
ond factor pointing in that direction is that if it were merely policies 
of the Reagan administration that were causing the change, then it would
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be difficult to explain why women are doing better and blacks are not. 
It is hard to believe that the Reagan administration targeted women for 
protective enforcement and blacks for neglect. So while discrimination 
may continue to be an issue in the United States, it is my view that 
it cannot explain changes in black-white or male-female wage 
differentials.
I'd like to turn now to what in some sense is the fundamental ques 
tion whenever discrimination is discussed: whether differences between 
races or sexes reflect choice or chance. Are blacks in low-paying jobs 
because they choose not to undertake training to the same extent as white 
or are blacks forced into those jobs because of discrimination in the 
system? Similarly, we observe that females tend to be in low-paying 
occupations and low-wage industries. Is that because they are preclud 
ed from entering certain occupations, or is it because women prefer 
to work in occupations that do not require serious commitments to the 
job but rather tolerate high turnover rates?
As difficult a question as this is to answer, there are data that speak 
to the issue. Duncan and Duncan (1955) devised an index to measure 
the amount of segregation in an economy. The Duncan index is a number 
that tells you the normalized proportion of individuals that would have 
to be moved in order to fully integrate a workforce. So for example, 
suppose that 50 percent of the workforce is male and 50 percent of the 
workforce is female; and suppose further that all females are in one 
job and that all males are in another job. Then in order to integrate 
the workforce fully, 50 percent of the females would have to be mov 
ed, and 50 percent of the males would have to be moved. The ratio 
of the number of people moved to the male population is the Duncan 
index; so in that case the number would be one. If women and men 
were assigned jobs randomly so that 50 percent of each set were in each 
job, then the Duncan index would be zero, because no one would have 
to be moved in order to totally integrate the workforce. So a number 
of zero means a fully integrated workforce; a value of one means a 
segregated workforce.
If a Duncan index is computed for males and females, the number 
turns out to be about .6. If the same exercise is done for black males and
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white males, the number is .2 meaning that many fewer workers would 
have to be moved in order to even out the job distribution. So black 
jobs are much more like white jobs than female jobs are like male jobs. 
Now, the ratio of black male wages to white male wages exceeds the 
ratio of white female wages to white male wages, but not substantially 
so. This means that people who receive similar earnings outcome in 
the economy relative to white males have very different occupational 
patterns.
Fuchs (1989) has interpreted this as meaning that the job distribution 
reflects choice and not chance. He argues that it is difficult to believe 
that black men face less discrimination than white females to such an 
extent that their jobs are quite similar to those of white males, whereas 
females are so discriminated against that their jobs are totally different. 
Recently, Francine Blau (1989) found that the Duncan index, which 
was falling for females for a period of time, is now starting to rise again, 
as new jobs are becoming female jobs.
The fact that women are concentrated in jobs that are not likely to 
be held by men has led the women's movement to push for comparable 
worth legislation; the comparable worth doctrine says that jobs have 
some inherent worth that can be measured, perhaps totally independent 
of the marketplace. For example, by assessing the kind of work that 
is done and the kind of responsibility associated with a nurse's job, we 
can determine the value of that job and compare it with the job of an 
electrician by looking at similar factors. This idea has gained legitimacy, 
and has actually been implemented in a number of countries most 
notably, Australia. In Canada, the province of Ontario implemented 
comparable worth across the board about a year ago.
There are several arguments against comparable worth. The first is 
that the market is the only index of worth, and there is never any reason 
for the government to intervene. This view is too strong. To accept 
it is to accept that there is no role, for example, for antitrust policy. 
If the market is the only index of value, then prices set by a monopolistic 
firm are the correct prices, and there is no reason to worry about cartel 
or monopoly behavior of any kind.
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Even the staunchest defenders of the free market at my institutions 
generally allow that firms have an incentive, if through no other way 
than attempting to influence government officials, to restrict markets, 
and to try to monopolize them. This creates inefficiencies in the economy 
that must be undone, and in these limited circumstances, government 
action is appropriate.
Once we allow for those kinds of arguments, then it seems clear that 
we can also extend the arguments to the labor market. Thus the dismissals 
of comparable worth on the grounds that it is a deviation from market 
prices, seem to me insufficient. Additionally, to even discuss comparable 
worth, you have to entertain at least the possibility that discrimination 
occurs in labor markets, so I shall begin with the working assumption 
that wage differentials in jobs may reflect discrimination.
For example, consider two occupations, nurses and electricians, and 
assume that electricians earn higher wages than nurses. First, one must 
ask why, under these circumstances, nurses don't enter the electrician 
occupation? There are two answers. The first answer is that they don't 
want to. If that's the answer, then there is neither a problem nor a 
remedy.
The wage differential between nursing and electrical work here reflects 
what we think of as an equalizing difference. Being an electrician is 
either harder, less interesting, or less rewarding in some other respect, 
and it must command a higher price as a result. The difference in wages 
under those circumstances would merely reflect a return to increased 
effort and pain associated with working that job. So if it is choice, then 
comparable worth clearly is an inappropriate remedy.
The second possibility is that the difference in wages between the 
male and female jobs is not the result of choice but the result of an ex 
clusionary policy by either employers or unions in the electricians' oc 
cupation which has somehow been effective at keeping females out of 
the occupation. Under those circumstances, discrimination has occur 
red and some adjustment is necessary. What comparable worth would 
seek to do is to raise the wage rates of nurses up to the wages of electri 
cians or to some other "comparable" job. The effect of this policy is 
to attract both women and men to the nurses' occupation, which makes 
the problem worse, not better.
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In fact, it does not address the problem at all. The problem, as you'll 
recall, is that women are precluded from entering the other occupa 
tion. If there were free mobility into the other occupation, there would 
be no problem in the first place, and comparable worth would not be 
needed. So the appropriate remedy is not comparable worth, but vigorous 
enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits job 
assignments on the basis of sex.
So by this reasoning, there is no role for comparable worth in the 
economy. Either wage differentials are there as a result of choice, in 
which case there is nothing to remedy; or wage differentials reflect 
discrimination, but the remedy for that discrimination is the removal 
of entry barriers into the segregated occupation, not raising wages in 
the flooded occupation.
There are some counters to this argument. The first counter, and prob 
ably the most compelling one, is that we've had Title VII since 1964 
and it hasn't worked, so we need to think about some other remedies. 
But if Title VII has not worked, why should comparable worth? In order 
for a law to work, enforcement is required, and enforcement can be 
applied to any law, if there is sufficient desire. The fact that Congress 
passes a statute that requires firms to set wages in some particular way 
does not mean that this will happen. If comparable worth can be en 
forced, so can Title VII, and I'd much rather see society's resources 
devoted to enforcing laws that create efficiency rather than laws that 
create inefficiency. The second problem is that enforcement of com 
parable worth is not without its costs. It would have the effect of creating 
an industry of experts and counter-experts, who would assess jobs and 
their worth for all parties. Litigation, as we are all aware, is not without 
its cost.
There are many problems associated with attempting to create indexes 
of worth. The first is that such indexes are subjective, and there are 
two levels of subjectivity. An index is subjective at the level of the in 
dex itself, and it is subjective at the level of the evaluator. First, I will 
provide an illustration of subjectivity at the level of the index.
Let there be two jobs, a schoolbus driver's job, and a sculptor's job, 
and suppose that we are constructing an index of job value by ranking
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the job on two of its characteristics: responsibility associated with the 
job, and know-how and skill associated with the job. Assume we all 
agree that a sculptor's job requires the maximum amount of skill, but 
has the minimum amount of responsibility associated with it, and that 
the schoolbus driver's job requires the minimum amount of skill, but 
the maximum amount of responsibility is associated with it. Let's sup 
pose further that the index for know-how goes between 10 and 15, 
whereas the index for responsibility is between 8 and 12. The sculptor 
receives 8 points for responsibility, but 15 points for know-how, giv 
ing us a total of 23 points. The schoolbus driver receives 12 points for 
responsibility, but only 10 points for know-how, making a total of 22. 
So, by this index, the sculptor is worth more:
Scale: Responsibility 8-12 Know-how 10-15
Sculptor receives 8 + 15 =23 
Bus driver receives 12 -I- 10 = 22
Consider a slightly different scaling, where the know-how scale stays 
the same, but we change the responsibility index so that its values go 
between 7 and 13, as opposed to between 8 and 12. Now the sculptor, 
who has the minimum amount of responsibility associated with his job, 
gets a score of 7 on responsibility, and 15 on know-how, giving us a 
total of 22. The schoolbus driver receives 13 on responsibility now, 
since that job requires the maximum amount, and a 10 on know-how, 
giving a total of 23. The schoolbus driver's job is now worth more.
Scale: Responsibility 7-13 Know-how 10-15
Sculptor receives 7 + 15 = 22 
Bus driver receives 13 + 10 = 23
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But these scalings of 8-12 or 7-13 are somewhat arbitrary. It's very 
difficult, ex ante, to judge which is the appropriate scaling, and very 
few of us would be willing to take a stand on one scale versus another. 
So I can reverse the value of jobs very easily by making minor changes 
in the values of the scales, and they might imply very different things 
about the amount of discrimination in an economy.
A second problem with indexes of this sort is that they are arbitrary 
at the level of the evaluator. Whereas I might assess the responsibility 
level of a sculptor's job at 7, someone else might give it an 8 or a 9. 
Similarly, someone might think that the know-how associated with be 
ing a schoolbus driver is not merely 10, but that it requires a level of 
12. Different evaluators will have different opinions, so that the index 
itself will be a function of the individuals evaluating the job. That is 
not a particularly attractive feature of an index on which salaries are 
going to be based.
The final problem with thinking about indexes and basing judgments 
about discrimination on them is that indexes of this sort focus on between- 
job rather than within-job variations, as illustrated by the following ex 
ample. Suppose that there are two jobs in the economy, one job which 
is called the male job because it has two men in it and one female; and 
one job which is called the female job, because it has two females and 
one male. In the male job, Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones each earn $12,000 
per year; Ms. Johnson earns $18,000 a year; so the average wage in 
the male job is $14,000. In the female job, Ms. Jackson and Ms. Roberts 
earn $15,000 a year; and Mr. Hill, the only man in the job, earns only 
$6,000 a year; so the average is $12,000.
Now in this extreme example, you'll notice that the average wage 
in the male job is higher than the average wage in the female job, and 
we might all agree ex ante that the female job is a more valuable job 
in some sense than the male job. Suppose we do. We might draw the 
inference from those numbers that females are discriminated against 
in this economy, because the jobs in which females happen to be located 
receive the lowest wages, even though those jobs are the higher valued 
jobs. But that inference would be completely inappropriate in this 
economy. If you'll notice, within job, women earn more than men. Also
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there is not one man in this economy who earns as much as the lowest 
paid female in the economy. The highest paid men in the economy are 
Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones, who earn $12,000 a year. The lowest paid 
females in the economy are Ms. Jackson and Ms. Roberts, who earn 
$15,000 a year. All female wages are higher than all male wages, and 
yet we would be inferring from this comparison that women are 
discriminated against. Nothing could be further from the truth. We are 
led to this inappropriate inference because the focus is on between-job 
comparisons, rather than on individual-based comparisons.













Average $14,000 Average $12,000
The absurdity of indexes is perhaps best illustrated by applying the 
technique to the product market, particularly, cognac and milk. It is 
likely that most sensible indexes would value milk more highly than 
cognac. After all, milk can sustain life; cognac cannot; and milk's social 
value seems much higher. Yet the price of cognac can be 30 (or more) 
times that of milk. Inferring that females are discriminated against in 
favor of males, by looking at wages versus external indexes of worth, 
is analogous to inferring that dairy farmers are discriminated against 
and grape producers favored because cognac, which is worth less than 
milk, receives 30 times its price.
Returning finally and briefly to age discrimination, the elimination 
of mandatory retirement by extension of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act to all-age individuals can have adverse effects on the 
economy. The major effect in my view is that mandatory retirement 
is the outgrowth of an incentive scheme which pays young workers less 
than they are worth and old workers more than they are worth, in order 
to provide performance incentives to workers who are close to the retire-
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ment age. The elimination of mandatory retirement makes it more dif 
ficult to use life-cycle compensation as an incentive device. In an era 
when productivity factors are important considerations, I think that the 
generalization of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act cannot 
have positive effects.
On the other hand, the empirical evidence suggests that the elimina 
tion of mandatory retirement is not particularly important. What estimates 
there are, reveal very small increases in the labor force participation 
rates of older workers. The exception is in academics, where work is 
so poorly defined that there is much less reason to retire.
Firms can also easily evade these laws by structuring the pension plan 
so that individuals who continue to work are penalized in the form of 
a lower present value of pension benefits, giving workers an incentive 
to retire. Virtually all defined benefit pension plans in the U.S. have 
the feature that once a worker works beyond a certain age, usually 
somewhere around 60, additional years of service reduce present value 
of the pension. The annual pension goes up, but losing that year's worth 
of pension more than offsets the increase in pension in subsequent years. 
A strategically designed pension plan is a substitute for mandatory retire 
ment and is a way to evade changes in the Age Discrimination in Employ 
ment Act. Courts have looked carefully at such pension provisions, but 
they have not cared much about reductions that are more than actuarial 
as an individual ages.
In conclusion, the effects of antidiscrimination legislation are unclear. 
First, there has been an increase in unemployment rates, and particularly 
unemployment rates among black workers; but the increase began well 
before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, and certainly before 
it had time to really bite. So it would be difficult to argue that the Civil 
Rights Act has had much effect on increasing unemployment. Second, 
in countries where comparable-worth-style legislation has been im 
plemented, a number of researchers have found that there is not much 
effect on employment. An Australian named Bob Gregory has found 
virtually no effect, although some of his colleagues find some signifi 
cant decreases in employment among females.
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But the basic result seems to be that discrimination laws do not have 
obvious detrimental effects on employment in an economy. Nor do they 
seem to have any obvious positive effects on wages. Average wages 
of females are up slightly, relative to males; but average wages of blacks, 
especially low-wage blacks, have not risen, relative to whites since the 
mid-1970s. To the extent that there has been long-term enforcement 
of discrimination laws for any group, blacks should be the most positively 
affected.
In conclusion, then, I believe that the picture on discrimination laws 
is mixed. In theory they are a good idea, but implementation has been 
uneven and the laws are perhaps harmful. But because they are enforc 
ed so poorly, even bad implementation seems to have little detrimental 
effect on the economy.
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